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The Supreme Court of North Carolina's Rulemaking Authority
and the Struggle for Power: State v. Tutt
Imagine that you are a state supreme court justice in your second
elected term. In addition to the expected stresses of following the law
and making sure justice is served while dealing with the political
ramifications of your decisions, a primary source of your anxiety is
the court's lack of funding You worry the court will have to reduce
the number of clerks or cut the support staff. This scenario is
undoubtedly a reality for many state judges. Each year, caseloads
and technological demands increase, and the difficulty of meeting
2
state citizens' needs within these constraints also continues to grow.
To compound these problems, judges must deal with challenges to the
efficiency of their courtrooms as lawmakers attempt to encroach on
the judiciary's ability to make court rules by enacting changes to state
evidentiary codes that directly contradict rules of court procedure.'
Such legislative action strips judges of the power to control their
courts' "essential functions," which makes efficient judicial
administration increasingly difficult when coupled with dwindling
funds and towering caseloads.4
The court's ability to determine which issues to consider on
appeal is an important part of streamlining the decision making
process. Prior to a 2004 amendment by the North Carolina General
Assembly, courts had interpreted rule 103(a) of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence to mean that a party must make an objection to
the admission of evidence at trial in order to preserve the issue of
admissibility of the evidence for appeal.' In contrast, the 2004
1. See, e.g., I. Beverly Lake, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of N.C., State of the
Judiciary Speech (Mar. 30, 2001), http://www.nccbi.org/LegislativeBulletin/LB-03-30Ollakespeech.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Speech by Chief Justice Lake]
(discussing the consequences of inadequate funding on the North Carolina court system).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 521, 615 S.E.2d 688, 690 (2005) (stating
that "Rule 103(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence is in direct conflict with
Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted by our case law on
point").
4. James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an Independent Judiciary, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 507, 509 (2002).
5. See State v. Short, 322 N.C. 783, 790, 370 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1988) ("Under ... Rule
103(a)(1) an assignment of error ordinarily will not be considered on appellate review
unless the error has been brought to the attention of the trial court by appropriate and
timely objection."); Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc. v. Sales, 82 N.C. App. 265, 269, 346
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amendment to rule 103(a) provided that a party need not object to
6
the admission of evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Tutt7
held that the general assembly's amendment to rule 103(a)
encroached upon the supreme court's constitutional authority to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure because it directly
conflicted with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure

10(b)(1). 8 The amendment to rule 103(a) provided: "Once the court
makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding

evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." 9
S.E.2d 212, 215 (1989) (interpreting rule 103(a) to mean that "error may not be predicated
upon the admission of evidence unless a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record").
6. The pertinent text of the amended rule reads:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling.-Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection.-In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record. No particular form is
required in order to preserve the right to assert the alleged error upon appeal
if the motion or objection clearly presented the alleged error to the trial
court;
(2) Offer of Proof.-In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or
offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a) (2005).
7. 171 N.C. App. 518,615 S.E.2d 688 (2005).
8. Id. at 519, 615 S.E.2d at 689. The text of rule 10(b)(1) reads:
(b) Preserving questions for appellate review.
(1) General. In order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party
must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion,
stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make
if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also
necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party's
request, objection or motion. Any such question which was properly
preserved for review by action of counsel taken during the course of
proceedings in the trial tribunal by objection noted or which by rule or law
was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, may be made the
basis of an assignment of error in the record on appeal.
N.C. R. APP. P. 10(b)(1).
9. See Act Conforming Rule 103 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to the
Corresponding Federal Rule, ch. 101, § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 127 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a) (2005)).
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The amendment thus allows parties to preserve an issue of
admissibility of evidence for appeal, even if they fail to make an
objection to the evidence in the trial court.
In Tutt, the defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of
photographic lineup evidence but argued on appeal that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress that evidence.' 0 The

court of appeals held that a pretrial motion to suppress was a type of

motion in limine." The court then reasoned that because "[the North
Carolina] Supreme Court has consistently held that '[a] motion in
limine is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the
admissibility of evidence' " if the defendant does not object to that
evidence at trial, the motion to suppress could not be considered on
appeal. 2 The court further held that the amendment to rule 103(a)
directly conflicted with the rules of appellate procedure,

3

and the

supreme court, not the general assembly, has the " 'exclusive
authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate
Division' " under the North Carolina Constitution. 4 The court struck
down the amendment as an unconstitutional exercise of state
legislative power due to its direct conflict with a rule of procedure
enacted by the supreme court in the course of its constitutionally
delegated powers. 5

The amendment to rule 103(a) was not a radical evidentiary
change; the general assembly specifically stated that it intended to
align the North Carolina Rules of Evidence with the Federal Rules of

Evidence. 6 The evidence issue in Tutt is essentially a red herring.

The larger, more compelling issue in the case is the power struggle

Tutt raises
between the general assembly and the judiciary.
interesting and controversial questions about which branch of state
10. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. at 519-20, 615 S.E.2d at 690.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting State v. Hayes, 350 N.C. 79, 80, 511 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1999) (per
curiam) (citations omitted)).
13. Id. at 521,615 S.E.2d at 690-91.
14. Id. at 521,615 S.E.2d at 691 (citing N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2)).
15. Id. at 519, 615 S.E.2d at 689. In contrast, the dissent in Tutt clearly supported
deference to the general assembly, arguing that rule 103(a)(2) is a rule of evidence and not
a rule of procedure, and such action was thus outside the realm of the supreme court's
rulemaking authority. Id. at 527, 615 S.E.2d at 694 (Tyson, J., dissenting). The dissent
further argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence should serve as a model for the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence, and because the amendment was in line with the federal
rules, it should stand. Id. at 530-31, 615 S.E.2d at 696-97 (Tyson, J., dissenting).
16. See Act Conforming Rule 103 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence to the
Corresponding Federal Rule, ch. 101, § 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 127 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a) (2005)).
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government should be able to draft court rules and how those rules
affect the judiciary.
This Recent Development explores the problem of state
legislatures infringing on judicial rulemaking authority. Specifically,
it discusses the origins of judicial rulemaking authority, the rationales
for courts having the power to create their own rules, and the
difficulty of determining whether rules are evidentiary or procedural
in nature. It also analyzes the main argument the dissent puts forth in
Tutt and determines that the rule at issue in Tutt is more a rule of
practice and procedure than a rule of evidence. This Recent
Development concludes that the majority opinion was correct in
holding that the North Carolina General Assembly cannot impinge
on the Supreme Court of North Carolina's authority to make rules of
appellate procedure for the state courts. Finally, it argues that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina must endorse and reinforce the
position of the majority in Tutt, make a strong ruling to prevent an
erosion of its authority, and preserve the separation of powers
between the judiciary and the general assembly.
The issue of whether court rules should be made by lawmakers
or courts is a source of conflict in many states.17 Commentators offer

17. See Kala Rogers Holt, The Balance of Power: Weidrick v. Arnold and the Conflict
over Legislative and Judicial Rulemaking Authority in Arkansas, 46 ARK. L. REv. 627,
642-48 (1993) (providing an overview of the power struggles over court rulemaking
authority in Texas, Connecticut, Mississippi, and Florida, and suggesting that Arkansas
consider amending the state constitution to help solve similar problems); Robert G.
Lawson, Modifying the Kentucky Rules of Evidence-A Separation of Powers Issue, 88 KY.
L.J. 525, 540-41 (2000) (describing the struggle faced by the federal courts and stating that
"[d]ebate has been raging for nearly a century over whether court rules should be made by
courts or legislatures, without a clear-cut resolution"). For cases dealing with this
controversy, see Weidrick v. Arnold, 835 S.W.2d 843, 845-46 (Ark. 1992) (holding that the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure superseded a law with which they conflicted); State v.
Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 728-30 (Conn. 1974) (holding that the judiciary has exclusive
rulemaking power on which the state legislature cannot intrude); Bluesten v. Fla. Real
Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1960) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court
has exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure for the state courts); R.A.
Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 857 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 2004) (holding that the
Maryland Supreme Court has broad constitutional power to adopt rules of practice and
procedure, but the Maryland General Assembly has concurrent jurisdiction over matters
of procedure); McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 153-55 (Mich. 1999) (holding that a
law enacted by the state legislature dealing with evidence in medical malpractice cases was
not an infringement on the court's constitutional power to make rules of procedure);
Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76-78 (Miss. 1975) (holding that procedural rules are to be
left to the judiciary because it is more well-versed in the law than the state legislature);
Stokes v. Denmark Emergency Med. Servs., 433 S.E.2d 850, 851-53 (S.C. 1993) (holding
that the South Carolina Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is subordinate to any laws
passed by the general assembly); White v. Berryman, 418 S.E.2d 917, 923-24 (W. Va.
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different rationales in support of state supreme courts having

authority over court rules instead of the legislatures. In articulating
these different rationales, commentators have noted that: (1) the
courts have familiarity and experience with court procedure and can
thus make better rules; 8 (2) the judiciary will be directly accountable
for the effects of its own methods of administration of justice; 9 (3)
judges tend to be more willing to modify and revise rules of
procedure as needed;2° and (4) judges have the ability to make the
rules clearer and more specific due to their experience with

courtroom procedure, thereby reducing litigation over
interpretation of legislative language.2' Some reasons given
allowing state legislatures to control court rulemaking include
following: judges could be out of touch with the needs of citizens

the
for
the
and

attorneys;2 2 judges could be biased and favor rules that meet only
their own needs;23 the state legislature better represents the public's
view of how courts should operate; 24 and courts will infringe upon or

create substantive rights if allowed exclusive rulemaking authority.
The fact that judges deal with rules of court procedure daily and
have a wealth of experience with the effectiveness of such rules is a
convincing argument in favor of judicial rulemaking power. Judges
are certainly not out of touch with what makes their courts function
most efficiently, and since judges in North Carolina are elected, they
1992) (holding that the state constitution recognizes the inherent power of the West
Virginia Supreme Court to make rules of court procedure).
18. Wolf, supra note 4, at 514 (stating that the strongest argument for judges having
control over rules of procedure is that they work with those rules every day and, thus, are
more knowledgeable about them); see also Bruce L. Dean, Rule-Making in Texas:
Clarifying the Judiciary'sPower to Promulgate Rules of Civil Procedure,20 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 139, 149-50 (1988).
19. Dean, supra note 18, at 149-50. This is especially true in states like North
Carolina where judges are elected by the citizenry. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16. It does
seem doubtful, though, that average citizens would be aware of court rules and would base
their vote on them.
20. Dean, supra note 18, at 149-50. This approach would ensure flexibility, but it
could also lead to the rules remaining in a state of flux, putting an extra burden on lawyers
to constantly make sure they are in compliance with the newest changes.
21. Id. The experience level of judges could allow them to create clearer rules than
members of state legislatures. However, judicial opinions are not always easy to interpret
or apply in practice, and such issues continually contribute to litigation.
22. Id.
23. Id. One could see how this might be true in cases like Tutt where the courtapproved rules reduce the number of appeals but might deprive citizens of justice because
their lawyers did not object to the admission of evidence at trial.
24. Id. This is not a persuasive argument in a state like North Carolina where judges
are democratically elected. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
25. Dean, supra note 18, at 149-50. This could be true in the case of a rule that makes
the appeals process more difficult, as manifested in Tutt.
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would have to tailor such rules to best serve the needs of citizens and
attorneys or risk not getting reelected. Even though the average
citizen has probably never seen the rules of appellate procedure, it is
doubtful that the Supreme Court of North Carolina will enact rules
that will infringe upon the rights or opportunities of the citizenry due
to the looming reality of reelection. If judges do overstep boundaries
by enacting a rule that imposes a burden upon the citizenry or exists
mostly to serve the court's own biases, the public can vote the judge
out when his or her term ends.
Many state constitutions give the state's highest court the power
to make rules of procedure for appellate courts,26 but many also
specify that these rules must not conflict with any state legislative
The degree of judicial power granted by state
provision. 2 7
constitutions in the Fourth Circuit varies. For example, the Virginia
Constitution states:
The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules
governing the course of appeals and the practice and
procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but
such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the
same shall, from time to time, be established by the General
Assembly.28
Similarly, the South Carolina Constitution states that "[t]he
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all
the courts of the State. Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme
Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure in all
such courts. '29 The Maryland Constitution gives the court of appeals,
the state's highest court, the power to adopt rules and regulations for
all the state courts, but the rules "shall be subject to the rules and
regulations adopted ... otherwise by law," indicating that the court's
rulemaking authority is subordinate to laws enacted by the state
legislature.3"
In contrast, the West Virginia Constitution gives the state
supreme court "power to promulgate rules for all cases and
proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State
relating to writs, warrants, process, practice and procedure, which
shall have the force and effect of law," with no mention of

26. Id.
27. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. V,
28. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
29. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.

30. See MD. CONST. art. IV,

§ 9.

§ 4; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
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Similarly, the North Carolina

Constitution does not contain a clause that the judiciary's rulemaking
authority must show deference to the legislature; in fact, it specifically
declares the supreme court's rulemaking authority to be "exclusive."32
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has emphasized that this
constitutionally granted authority may not be encroached upon by the
legislature, even when the rules in question are rules of evidence and

not rules of practice and procedure, holding that "[t]he Legislature
has virtually untrammeled authority to codify and change the rules of

evidence so long as due process is accorded and no other
constitutionalprovisions are infringed."33

Based on the explicit constitutional grant of power and its
reaffirmation by the court of appeals, it seems that there is little
doubt that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has authority over
rules of court practice and procedure. However, the judiciary appears
to have little to no influence over the rules of evidence, where rule
103 lies.34 The court of appeals has stated that "[i]t is well settled in

this State that it is within the power of the General Assembly to
change the rules of evidence,"35 and the rulings of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina support this point.36 Unlike the procedure for
modification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 37 North Carolina does
not provide for an advisory panel that counsels the general assembly
on modifications to the rules of evidence.38 However, the North
Carolina General Statutes Commission, a twelve-member panel
comprised of attorneys, professors from state law schools, and
representatives from the North Carolina Senate and House of
Representatives, 39 does have some influence on the general
31. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
32. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have
exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division").
33. State v. Taylor, 63 N.C. App. 364, 366, 304 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1983) (emphasis
added) (citing 1 BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 6 (2d rev. ed. 1982)).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2005).
35. State v. Lassiter, 13 N.C. App. 292, 297, 185 S.E.2d 478, 482 (1971).
36. Bockweg v. Anderson, 328 N.C. 436, 452, 402 S.E.2d 627, 637 (1991) (stating that
"the General Assembly is the sole source of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
unless this authority is expressly delegated to the Supreme Court").
37. The Federal Rules of Evidence are amended through the following process: (1)
the Supreme Court formulates amendments; (2) Congress reviews these amendments; and
(3) Congress can reject or alter the proposed amendments, or it can set a fixed date for
when they become effective. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 529 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1990); 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988)).
38. Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, Assistant Legal Counsel, N.C. Admin.
Office of the Courts, in Raleigh, N.C. (Oct. 7, 2005).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 164-14 (2005). Members are appointed as follows:
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assembly.4" The commission prepares and recommends statutory
changes to the general assembly and advises the Department of

Justice's Division of Legislative Drafting and Codification in statutory
research and correction.4'
Currently, no judges serve on the
commission,4" although nothing bars judges or former judges from

serving

if

they

are

appointed

according

to

the

statutory

requirements. 43 Thus, it seems that even though the North Carolina

1) One member, by the president of the North Carolina State Bar;
2) One member, by the General Statutes Commission;
3) One member, by the dean of the school of law of the University of North
Carolina;
4) One member, by the dean of the school of law of Duke University;
5) One member, by the dean of the school of law of Wake Forest University;
6) One member, by the Speaker of the House of Representatives of each
General Assembly from the membership of the House;
7) One member, by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate of each General
Assembly from the membership of the Senate;
8) Two members, by the Governor;
9) One member, by the dean of the school of law of North Carolina Central
University;
10) One member, by the president of the North Carolina Bar Association;
11) One member, by the dean of the school of law of Campbell University.
Id.
40. § 164-13. The commission's duties are:
(1) To advise and cooperate with the Division of Legislative Drafting and
Codification of Statutes of the Department of Justice in the work of continuous
statute research and correction for which the Division is made responsible by G.S.
114-9(3).
(2) To advise and cooperate with the Division of Legislative Drafting and
Codification of Statutes in the preparation and issuance by the Division of
supplements to the General Statutes pursuant to G.S. 114-9(2).
(3) To make a continuing study of all matters involved in the preparation and
publication of modern codes of law.
(4) To recommend to the General Assembly the enactment of such substantive
changes in the law as the Commission may deem advisable.
(5) To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended by the
American Law Institute, by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws or by other learned bodies.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, supra note 38; E-mail from Kenneth S.
Broun, Henry Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, to
author (Oct. 7, 2005, 09:02:41 EST) (stating that North Carolina has no committee of
judges charged with reviewing evidence rules) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
43. See § 164-14.
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judiciary has sole authority over rules of practice and procedure, it
has virtually no influence over the rules of evidence.
Even though the general assembly has the power to modify the
rules of evidence without input from the supreme court, it cannot
encroach on the constitutionally granted rulemaking power of the
court. The general assembly also lacks the authority to amend the
rules of evidence if a change conflicts with a rule of practice or
procedure that the supreme court has made under its constitutionally
granted authority." However, determining whether a rule is one of
evidence or one of practice and procedure, and thus deciding which
branch has authority over which rules, is not always easy.4"
The main point of disagreement between the majority and the
dissent in Tutt was whether rule 103 is a rule of evidence or one of
procedure. The dissent in Tutt claimed that rule 103 is a rule of
evidence because it mirrors the Federal Rules of Evidence; therefore,
the general assembly has the power to enact it.46 As of 2002, thirtynine states had adopted evidence rules based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence.47 The federal rules can be a model for state evidence
codes, but there are important differences between the state scheme
and the federal scheme. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence are
"inspired by and largely modeled after (but not identical to) the
Federal Rules of Evidence."4 8 In general, the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence and the federal rules closely parallel each other.
However, the federal model of separation of rulemaking powers is
quite different from most state schemes.4 9 State constitutions differ
greatly from the United States Constitution in the powers they confer
on the legislature and the courts.5 " The United States Constitution,
unlike the North Carolina Constitution, expressly gives Congress the

44. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2).
45. The process of making this distinction could perhaps be facilitated by the
appointment of state judges or former judges to the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission, who could give valuable insight into the rules of appellate procedure and
help prevent conflicts like the one in Tutt.
46. State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 530-31, 615 S.E.2d 688, 696 (2005) (Tyson, J.,
dissenting).
47. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-TestimonialPrivileges
and the FederalRules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 789-90 (2002).
48. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 2 (6th ed. 2004).

49. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
50. Michael P. Dickey, The Florida Evidence Code and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine: How to Distinguish Substance and Procedure Now That It Matters, 34 STETSON
L. REV. 109, 131 (2004). This difference is often said to occur because of the principles of
federalism. Id.

20061
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"authority to regulate practice and procedure in federal courts."5
Congress gave the United States Supreme Court the power "to make
rules of procedure and of evidence" when it passed the Rules
Enabling Act.52 Rules of procedure and rules of evidence are created
by advisory committees to the Supreme Court and can be modified by
Congress.53
Another difference between the federal model and some state
models, as the majority in Tutt pointed out, is that "the United States
Constitution has no provision similar to that of section thirteen of the
North Carolina Constitution," which grants exclusive rulemaking
authority to the supreme court.54 The majority thus concluded that
rule 103 was one of appellate procedure because: "(1) the North
Carolina Constitution vests with our Supreme Court the authority to
make appellate rules of practice and procedure and (2) under N.C. R.
App. P. 10(b)(1), our Supreme Court has long held that this rule is
one of practice and procedure."5 5 The distinct differences between
the federal and state models, coupled with the long history of case law
relying on rule 10(b)(1) as a rule of court procedure,5 6 render
unpersuasive the dissent's assertion that the rule is one of evidence
because it is based on the federal rules.
Other courts have distinguished rules of evidence from rules of
procedure in different ways. Some courts have decided that "a rule of
evidence is procedural only to the extent it affects matters of court
administration," while others "treat a rule of evidence as substantive
only if it affects the outcome of the litigation in the eyes of the
reviewing court."57 The debate over what makes something a rule of
evidence or a rule of practice and procedure is a longstanding one
with no resolution. 8 However, the consensus among those who have

51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
53. Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000)).
54. State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 524, 615 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2005). Section thirteen
of the North Carolina Constitution states that "t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive
authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division." N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 13(2).
55. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. at 523, 615 S.E.2d at 692. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina recently affirmed rule 10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure,
holding that because a defendant did not raise objections to certain evidentiary statements
at trial, those statements would not be considered on appeal. See State v. Barden, 356
N.C. 316, 346,572 S.E.2d 108, 128 (2002).
56. See Tutt, 171 N.C. App. at 523, 615 S.E.2d at 692 (listing cases where rule 10(b)(1)
was followed by the appellate courts in North Carolina).
57. Dickey, supra note 50, at 122-23.
58. Lawson, supra note 17, at 541.
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studied the issue is that the large majority of evidence law is
procedural. 59 Professor Earl C. Dudley describes rules of evidence as
rules " 'designed to affect conduct outside the courtroom' " and rules
of procedure as rules enacted " 'to enhance the accuracy of the fact
finding process.' "I Certainly some rules can serve both purposes,
and in that situation, Professor Dudley suggests that a dominant
purpose be identified.61 In the case of a conflict between rule 103 and
rule 10(b)(1), objecting to a pretrial motion in order to preserve that
issue for appeal speaks directly to the appeals process and deals with
a matter of court administration as well as behavior inside the
courtroom. Rule 10(b)(1) and the unamended version of rule 103
enhance the administration of justice by eliminating issues that the
supreme court designated as not properly preserved for appeal, thus
allowing the court to perform its job more efficiently.62 Despite the
amended rule 103's similarity to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
dominant purpose of rule 103 seems to be procedural and not
evidentiary in nature.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has demonstrated that it
views the underlying issue in rule 103 to be procedural in nature, as it
has shown a willingness to strike down statutes that impinge on that
rule as unconstitutional. In State v. Bennett,63 the court held section
15A-1446(d)(13) and part of section 15A-1231(d) of the North
Carolina General Statutes unconstitutional to the extent that they
conflicted with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure
10(b)(2).' The court stated, "Rule 10(b)(2) is a rule of appellate
practice and procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its exclusive authority under the Constitution of North Carolina,
Article IV, Section 13(2). To the extent that G.S. 15A-1446(d)(13) is
inconsistent with Rule 10(b)(2), the statute must fail." 65

59. Id. at 569.
60. Id. at 570-71 (quoting Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilegeand Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1797 (1994)).
61. Id. at 571.
62. The court can still consider certain issues on appeal even if rule 10(b)(1) is
violated because rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure states that
"[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest,
either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these
rules, suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these rules ....
N.C. R.
APP. P. 2.
63. 308 N.C. 530, 302 S.E.2d 786 (1983).
64. Id. at 535, 302 S.E.2d at 790.
65. Id. (citations omitted).
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In State v. Stocks,6 6 the supreme court again held a statute
unconstitutional because it conflicted with North Carolina Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3). 67 The court stated:
N.C.G.S. 15A-1446(d)(5) provides that errors based upon
insufficiency of the evidence may be the subject of appellate
review even though no objection, exception or motion has been
made in the trial division. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3), however,
provides that a defendant "may not assign as error the
insufficiency of the evidence to prove the crime charged unless
he moves to dismiss the action, or for judgment as in case of
nonsuit, at trial." To the extent that N.C.G.S. 15A-1446(d)(5) is
inconsistent with N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3), the statute must
fail.6 8
The majority in Tutt noted that these cases involved situations
where the general assembly attempted to "make a rule of practice or
procedure for the Appellate Division. '69 Based on Bennett and
Stocks, the supreme court's interpretation of what constitutes a rule
of procedure seems simple: if a rule directly conflicts with one of the
court's rules of procedure, it is itself equivalent to a rule of procedure
and impinges on the court's authority. The majority in Tutt analyzed
the amendment to rule 103 under this philosophy, stating that the
amendment "would allow appellate review of an evidentiary ruling
even though the party failed to follow the Supreme Court's
procedural requirements under N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) mandating
that the party further object at trial."70
In addition to the distinction between rules of evidence and
procedure, courts can look to their "essential functions" as a basis for
asserting their rulemaking authority.7 Judge James R. Wolf, of the
Florida First District Court of Appeals, described the judiciary's
rulemaking authority as a way for it to ensure that it can perform its
essential functions:
The emphasis on the court's ability to function ... is an
apparent recognition of an independent source of powers for
the court's rulemaking authority. This independent source of
authority may arise from the concept of separation of powers or
66.
67.
68.
160-61,
69.
70.
71.

319 N.C. 437, 355 S.E.2d 492 (1987).
Id. at 439, 355 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. (citing Bennett, 308 N.C. at 535, 302 S.E.2d at 790; State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157,
273 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1981)).
State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 523,615 S.E.2d 688,692 (2005).
Id.
Wolf, supra note 4, at 509.
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from the necessity of a court having those powers to enable it to
perform essential functions. If so, it is a vital recognition that
an independent court system has inherent powers within the
area of rulemaking which cannot be usurped.72
Courts have also considered whether the statute affects the
judiciary's efficiency and effectiveness when deciding whether a
statute should be invalidated as an infringement on court rulemaking
authority.73 Other courts have relied on the "judiciary's inherent
authority to promulgate rules of practice, procedure, and evidence" in
its own courtrooms.7 4 This theory suggests that all courts have an
authority " 'beyond legislative power' " that stems " 'from the very
fact that it is a court' " to control rules that are " 'essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the court.' "I' The North Carolina
General Assembly's own words support this theory. The North
Carolina General Statutes state that "[t]he Supreme Court shall
prescribe rules of practice and procedure designed to procure the
expeditious and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in the
appellate division."7 6
The efficiency-effectiveness analysis is particularly applicable to
the potential repercussions of the amendment to rule 103. The
amendment would allow defendants to preserve issues for appeal
without objecting at trial, exerting a detrimental impact on a court's
ability to perform its essential functions. The holding of Tutt rectifies
this and allows the courts to control which issues they examine on
appeal.
Based on this analysis, the amendment could be viewed cynically
as a power grab by the general assembly that will increase the courts'
caseload and thus impair their ability to perform their essential
functions, while providing no corresponding increases in the
judiciary's budget. In the Administrative Office of the Courts Fiscal
Year 2001-02 Annual Report, Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr.,
discussed the state courts' struggle to function after severe budget
cuts and stated that "the continual lack of necessary resources and
funding could eventually have serious effects on the quality of justice

72. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
73. Justin L. Matheny, Comment, Inherent Judicial Rule Making Authority and the
Right to Appeal: Time for Clarification,22 MISS. C. L. REV. 57, 60 (2002).
74. Id. at 57.
75. Wolf, supra note 4, at 514 (quoting Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Legislative Control over JudicialRule-Making: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1958)).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33 (2005).
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that our court system can provide for North Carolinians."77 The
2002-03 annual report noted that the 2002-03 fiscal year was a period
of "severe budget cuts" and that the caseload of the court system
"ha[d] increased in both quantity and complexity."78 Chief Justice
Lake also commented on the state of judiciary funding in his 2001
"State of the Judiciary Speech" delivered to the North Carolina
General Assembly:
For many years now, our entire third branch of government ...
has been required to operate with less than 3 percent of all
funds available to the State of North Carolina. With that level
of funding, we have not been able to meet adequately our
constitutional responsibilities and expand our services as
demanded by our growing population.79
The 2003-04 Judicial Report listed funding as one of the
judiciary's "challenges for the future," noting that "[t]he Judicial
Branch received only 2.6% of the entire state budget in Fiscal Year
2003-04." 80 The general assembly must have enacted the amendment
to rule 103 with the knowledge that not requiring an objection to
preserve an issue for appeal could put further strain on the already
overburdened court system. Recently, the supreme court again
expressed its desire to operate with streamlined efficiency by holding
that appeals not following the prescribed rules should be dismissed.8
The amendment to rule 103 works against this spirit of streamlined
efficiency, as well as against the court's efforts to make the best use of
limited funding.
Judge Wynn, writing for the majority in Tutt, asked the Supreme
Court of North Carolina to grant discretionary review to the case
"because of the importance of deciding the Rule 103 issue."'82 If the
Supreme Court of North Carolina does not take up the separation of
77. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PLANNING, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
FISCAL YEAR 2001-02 ANNUAL REPORT: THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH
(2002), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens[Publications/Documents/annrepO2.pdf.
78. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PLANNING, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
FISCAL YEAR 2002-03 ANNUAL REPORT: THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH

(2003), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Publications/Documents/annrep03.pdf.
79. Speech by Chief Justice Lake, supra note 1.
80. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PLANNING, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
FISCAL YEAR 2003-04 ANNUAL REPORT: THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH

(2004), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Publications/Documents/annrepO4.pdf.
81. See Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (2005)
(per curiam) (holding that "[tlhe North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are
mandatory and 'failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal' " (quoting
Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999))).
82. State v. Tutt, 171 N.C. App. 518, 523 n.2, 615 S.E.2d 688, 692 n.2 (2005).
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powers problem from Tutt, it risks contributing to its burgeoning
caseload by sanctioning the allowance of issues during the appeals
process that were not preserved at the trial level. The broader, more
important issue in Tutt that the court must address is its tolerance for
infringements on its rulemaking authority through changes to the
rules of evidence. Because there was a dissenting opinion, the parties
in Tutt have an automatic right to appeal to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, 83 but no appeal was filed and the court did not grant
discretionary review.' However, the supreme court must review the
rulemaking issue raised in Tutt, perhaps by ruling on cases that follow
the holding of Tutt, in order to solidify its authority and ensure its
ability to function efficiently and effectively.
The supreme court asserted its authority to make rules of
appellate procedure by overturning criminal statutes that conflict with
its rules,85 so it is almost certain that the court will continue to uphold
its power. However, the supreme court has no precedent that
specifically deals with how the courts should respond when the
general assembly encroaches on its rulemaking authority by
modifying the rules of evidence. Generally, North Carolina case law
provides no protocol for lower courts to follow in situations where
statutes infringe on court rules. Because of the complete absence of
precedent in this area, the supreme court must not only uphold the
court of appeals' finding that the amendment to rule 103 is
unconstitutional, but also must define the nature of its rulemaking
authority and set out a scheme for determining the scope of this
authority. The supreme court should emphasize that it is necessary
for a court to have the authority it needs to make rules that allow it to
perform its essential functions,86 and it should reiterate the general
assembly's own words that "[t]he Supreme Court shall prescribe rules
of practice and procedure designed to procure the expeditious and
inexpensive dispositionof all litigationin the appellate division."'87
83. See N.C. R. APP. P. 14(b)(1).
84. Telephone Interview with Christie Cameron, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of
N.C., in Raleigh, N.C. (May 29, 2006).
85. See, e.g., State v. Stocks, 319 N.C. 437, 439, 355 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1987) (holding
that a state rule of appellate procedure regarding preservation of errors based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence overruled an inconsistent state statute); State v. Bennett, 308
N.C. 530, 535, 302 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1983) (holding that a state rule of appellate procedure
requiring a timely objection to jury charges overruled an inconsistent state statute); State
v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 160, 273 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1981) (holding criminal statutes
unconstitutional because they conflicted with the supreme court's authority to make rules
of practice and procedure).
86. See Wolf, supra note 4, at 509.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33 (2005) (emphasis added).
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The court should also define its inherent rulemaking power,
derived "from the very fact that it is a court, ' 88 as the Arkansas
Supreme Court has done.89 The court is facing an unprecedented
workload and increasing technological demands.9 It is especially
crucial in this era of stagnant court funding that the court refuse to
tolerate statutory hindrances to its effectiveness and efficiency.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has underscored the importance of
rulings like Tutt:
[T]he jurisprudence on separation of powers ...is scarce.

There are scattered opinions, but little in the way of sustained
development of analysis. There really needs to be, in [court]
opinions ...development of the idea when legislative actions
interfere with the essential functions of the courts .... The
more [court] opinions can develop this ...the better the courts

can be protected from the statutory threat.91

If the Supreme Court of North Carolina does not take up the
issues implicated in Tutt, it risks relinquishing its constitutional
authority to the general assembly while impairing the quality of
services it provides to North Carolina citizens.
AMANDA

G. RAY

88. Wolf, supra note 4, at 514.
89. See Angela Biggers, Case Note, Special Proceedings in Arkansas after Weiss v.
Johnson, 52 ARK. L. REV. 233 (1999) (noting that the Arkansas Supreme Court has held
that it has an inherent rulemaking authority not derived from the state legislature or the
state constitution).
90. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PLANNING, supra note 77, at 20.
91. Wolf, supra note 4, at 507 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing Remarks at 1998
Forum for State Court Judges, in ASSAULTS ON THE JUDICIARY:

ATTACKING "THE

GREAT BULWARK OF PUBLIC LIBERTY" 139 (Roscoe Pound Found. ed., 1999)).
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